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The Emergence of Informal Institutions 
among Internal Migrants in Urban China 
Rumin LUO 
Abstract: China’s dramatic economic development and urbanisation 
have led to an increase in its number of internal migrants. As of 2013, 
this group accounted for more than 20 per cent of the country’s popu-
lation, and approximately 70 per cent of people in this group are 
working in the informal economy. This paper pays special attention 
to migrant-traders in the informal sector and the strategies they use in 
Shanghai. Migrants are doubly marginalised by the hukou (ᡧਓ) and 
danwei (অս) systems in the megacity and have only limited access to 
social welfare. It is argued that the informal strategies of these mar-
ginalised actors develop in related patterns of social relationships and 
institutional constraints. Such strategies create new forms of informal 
institutions that are justified and gain legitimacy when countering 
unequal and hierarchical formal institutions and social arrangements. 
This paper empirically explores how informal institutions can act in 
parallel with or diverge from formal institutions, and how they might 
influence formal institutions in the long term. 
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Introduction 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported that the share of 
internal migrants (289 million) in 2013 exceeded 20 per cent of the 
country’s 1.36 billion inhabitants. The total number of migrant work-
ers reached 269 million by the end of 2013, which accounted for 
almost 35 per cent of all employed people in China (NBS 2014). This 
was the largest internal migration in the world, comprising almost 39 
per cent of the world’s total internal migrants (740 million) in 2013 
and even surpassing the number of international migrants (232 mil-
lion) (IOM 2014). For these internal migrants, due to their disadvan-
taged status and lack of both human capital and social networks, 
getting into the formal sector in urban areas is difficult. In China and 
most other developing countries, most migrants end up in the infor-
mal sector, in small production units or service industries in the pri-
vate sector, or working as street vendors, domestic workers, or small-
business employees (ILO 2002). In 2005 approximately 70 per cent 
of rural-to-urban migrant workers undertook informal jobs (Wu 
2009; Xue and Gao 2012), and rural-to-urban migrant workers ac-
counted for 66.2 per cent of the total urban informal employment in 
China in 2002 (Yao 2006). This data is set against a backdrop of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, in which 40 to 60 per cent of 
all urban employment was informal (Huang 2009; Yao 2006); in 2013 
the corresponding figure was 33 per cent (ILO 2013). The proportion 
of informal employment relative to total employment among urban 
local residents increased from 19 per cent in 2001 to 33 per cent (or 
52.78 per cent, according to Xue and Gao [2012]) in 2005, and the 
share of informal migrant workers rose from 73 per cent to 84 per 
cent in the same timeframe (Du, Cai, and Wang 2006).  
Workers involved in informal economies worldwide who lack 
access to social security mechanisms – such as pensions, healthcare, 
medical insurance, and income protection due to irregular work – are 
drawing increasing academic attention (ILO 2014a, 2014b). In China, 
this special group of migrants – migrating from rural to urban areas, 
working in the informal sector – are in a more marginalised position 
than those in the informal sector who are not migrants, because they 
lack a safety net and social welfare protections that are tied to danwei  
(অս, work unit) systems and/or hukou (ᡧਓ, household registration) 
systems.  
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Since 1949, the danwei system has been seen as a socio-spatial 
unit where the livelihood and domestic and social activities of its 
members are carried out in the urban areas (Bjorklund 1986). Its 
function in a planned economy is far beyond that of production or-
ganisation and extends to the distribution of daily household items, as 
well as all forms of welfare, including housing, pensions, education, 
and healthcare. In the meantime, unequal resource allocation between 
rural and urban spaces has been governed through the hukou system 
since 1958, which has been compared to the Indian caste system by 
Whyte (2010), and to the passport system for transnational migrants 
(Wang 2005), with regard to the ways in which welfare benefits and 
public resources were unequally distributed in rural/urban segregated 
society and space (Davis 1989; Cheng and Selden 1994; Christiansen 
1990; Chan and Zhang 1999). The passport system controls the entry 
and access to welfare of transnational migrants in foreign countries, 
while internal migrants in China face similar restrictions when they 
enter cities other than the place where their hukou is registered. The 
segregation of welfare provision between rural and urban spaces is a 
burden borne largely by migrants. Those migrants are not legitima-
tised by the hukou and danwei systems and are therefore marginalised 
by the social welfare system in urban China. 
Given the large numbers of internal migrant workers who have 
been absorbed by the informal economy, surprisingly few studies 
have undertaken an in-depth empirical examination of exactly how 
actors develop strategies to create informal institutions and thus act 
against the hierarchical or unequal formal institutions. This paper 
focuses on this group of people and how they cope with the structur-
al limitations in order to survive and succeed in the cities. This article1 
intends to use empirical evidence to understand these actors, their 
behaviours under the constraints of formal institutions, and how their 

1 The data for this paper was collected while I was working at the Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity in Göttingen and at 
the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Duisburg-Essen, from 2012 to 
2014. A draft of this paper was first presented for the panel “Extending the 
boundaries of the welfare domain – the margins and the marginalized in Chi-
na’s new social policy” at the 2013 conference of the AAS, 21–24 March 2013, 
in San Diego, United States. I would like to thank Dr. Tao Liu and Dr. Armin 
Müller for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Further 
assistance provided by Mr. Connor Malloy is also highly appreciated. I would 
also like to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. 
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strategies not only create new forms of informal institutions, which 
are divergent to those of formal institutions, but also bring about 
institutional changes. 
I argue that individuals’ actions create new forms of informal in-
stitutions that involve a characteristic social structure and related 
patterns of social relationships. By informal institutions, I mean 
norms, beliefs, social/community rules, codes of conduct, and social 
practice: behavioural regularities based on socially shared rules, usual-
ly unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned channels (North 1990, 1991; Helmke and Levit-
sky 2003; Pejovich 1999). This distinction of informal institutions is 
legitimised and justified given the efforts of migrants located in urban 
spaces to counter marginalising formal institutions.  
This paper consists of five sections. In the following section, I 
briefly introduce the theory of formal and informal institutions. In 
the section thereafter, I explain the methods. Then, by using the ethno-
graphic data in Shanghai, I introduce in the next section three types 
of informal institutions created by migrants’ strategies – hukou trans-
fer as a code of conduct, justified artificiality as a new norm, and the 
legitimacy of guanxi as an informal practice – which reflect the emer-
gence of new informal institutions that act divergently to the formal 
institutions, especially the hukou and danwei systems. In the last sec-
tion, I draw conclusions and discuss why the emergence of informal 
institutions might bring about formal institutional changes.  
Theoretical Context 
Sociologist Anthony Giddens (1984: 24) sees institutions as “the 
more enduring features of social life” and goes on to list them as 
institutional orders, modes of discourse, political institutions, eco-
nomic institutions, and legal institutions (Giddens 1984: 31). Rom 
Harre follows the theoretical sociologists:  
An institution was defined as an interlocking double-structure of 
persons-as-role-holders or office-bearers and the like, and of so-
cial practices involving both expressive and practical aims and 
outcomes. (Harre 1979: 98) 
Economist Douglass North (1990, 1991) further defines institutions 
as “rules of the game” and as constraints that structure political, eco-
nomic, and social interaction, which include formal institutions (rules, 
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constitutions, laws, and property rights) and informal institutions 
(constraints, sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct). In this paper specifically, “formal institutions” refers to the 
welfare policies, welfare system, hukou system, and danwei system, 
which all serve to regulate and offer social protections to citizens and 
migrants. “Informal institutions” refers to norms, beliefs, social/ 
community rules, codes of conduct, and social practices like guanxi  
(ޣ㌫, connection) networks, which all provide informal protection 
for migrants. Formal institutions are readily recognised as the official 
rules, those written down in law and typically enforced by a state. 
Meanwhile, informal institutions are a behavioural regularity based on 
socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicat-
ed, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels (Helmke 
and Levitsky 2003; Pejovich 1999). 
The conventional theories of formal and informal institutions 
speak to the dichotomy between these two types of institutions as 
well their systematic and dynamic relationship (Ostrom 2009). North 
points to the fact that informal institutions are actually the origin of 
formal institutions, and that the latter are constrained by the former. 
In other words, North (1990, 2005) argues that the process of institu-
tional change is caused by actors and individuals reacting to perceived 
risk according to their beliefs, which can be influenced by cultural 
elements, and then creating new institutions which might be useful in 
mitigating this risk and/or improving economic development. Greif 
(2006: 379) suggests that institutions are the “engine of history” in 
that they are responsible for the incentives that drive actions and the 
further development of new institutions. This has been shown in 
different countries, but mostly in contexts of economics and political 
science. Japanese economist Aoki has a similar view; he developed 
the comparative institutional analysis (CIA) model (2001: 12), in 
which the institution is seen as a circulating loop of shared beliefs 
that are formed “as summary representations of an equilibrium.” 
Using Chinese cases of private entrepreneurs, Nee and Opper (2012: 
20) show a multilevel model of institutional change to explain how 
informal norms change formal rules through actors in China. Political 
scientist Tsai (2006: 117, 2007) explores the idea that entrepreneurs 
have created a range of adaptive informal institutions, which, in turn, 
have fundamentally altered China’s political and regulatory landscape 
and “serve a vital intermediate role in explaining the process of en-
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dogenous institutional change.” Christiansen (1989: 80–81) has ex-
plored the examples of how Document 1 (ѝཞаਧ᮷Ԧ, Zhongyang 
yihao wenjian) in 1983 tacitly accepted the existence of rural private 
enterprises with more than seven employees before the legalisation of 
private enterprises in 1988; this showed that some informal rules are 
actually created in the loop of formal institutions, hence informal 
institutions are situational and are the rational responses of actors. 
Pejovich (1999) argues that the relationship between formal and 
informal institutions is exceptionally important inasmuch as there will 
be economic loss if the formal institutions are in conflict with infor-
mal institutions, or vice versa. According to Pejovich (1999), the state 
must take care to construct formal institutions either that are in line 
with informal institutions or that actively work to bring informal 
institutions in line with the formal institutions. According to different 
outcomes of convergence or divergence, there are four types of rela-
tionship between formal and informal institutions (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2006: 14). Table 1 describes the relationship between formal 
and informal institutions, essentially stating that informal institutions 
may be complementary, substitutive, accommodating, or competitive 
vis-à-vis formal institutions, depending on the effectiveness of formal 
institutions. “Effectiveness” examines whether the rules on paper are 
enforced in practice. Therefore, formal and informal institutions 
might converge or diverge, depending on whether their outcomes are 
“substantially different” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 14). Moreover, 
de Soysa and Jütting (2007) suggests that converging formal and in-
formal institutions can either support each other or create a situation 
in which the informal may undermine the formal, even though they 
are striving towards a similar end. In addition, even if formal and 
informal institutions are divergent, one may accommodate the other 
in a way that will not violate the law of the formal institution and the 
spirit of the informal institution. However, it can be ineffective when 
accommodation is not possible, competition arises, and both formal 
and informal institutions present alternatives that contradict the other.  
Table 1. Typology of Informal Institutions 
Outcomes Effective formal institutions Ineffective formal institutions
Convergent Complementary Substitutive 
Divergent Accommodating Competing 
Source: Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 14. 
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As North (2005: 7) points out, actors facing risk have the rationality 
to change institutions, mostly based on their “beliefs,” which are 
influenced by rules, norms, and cultures in a society. This paper in-
tends to use ethnographic data to empirically examine how the actors 
bring about the emergence of divergent informal institutions when 
they are facing unequal and hierarchical institutions which offer citi-
zens hierarchical welfare. There are three steps to identifying informal 
institutions, according to Helmke and Levitsky (2003):  
 specify shared expectations, 
 specify the community, and 
 identify the mechanism.  
In this paper, I specify the special groups of migrants working in the 
informal economy and try both to specify their new expectations, 
new norms, codes of conduct and to identify the working mecha-
nism. I argue that divergent informal institutions have worked in 
parallel with formal institutions, but may eventually lead to accom-
modation as long as the formal rules (the hukou and danwei systems, in 
the Chinese case), are acting effectively, meaning that those rules and 
procedures are enforced or complied with strictly (Helmke and Levit-
sky 2006). 
Research Methods and Key Definitions 
This paper is based on a part of the empirical material collected in the 
course of several eldwork phases, mainly in June and July of both 
2012 and 2013, and also in September of 2014 as part of a larger 
study on migrants’ formal and informal social protection in Chinese 
megacities. The ethnographic and qualitative data in this paper stems 
from the materials collected in a speculative market in the megacity 
Shanghai. 
Three methods are adopted for data collection. First, the mega-
cities and the market were selected through purposeful sampling 
based on the availability and the research purposes (Patton 1990). 
Megacities (in this case, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Beijing) were 
selected because of the extent to which they are major destinations 
for internal migrants. The speculation market itself is one new type of 
informal sector. Due to the continuing economic boom especially 
since 1990s, these markets have attracted migrants who are looking 
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for informal employment and who have “urban aspirations”: they 
want to resettle in the cities. Second, after I entered the market, I 
encountered and interviewed more migrant entrepreneurs through 
the “snowball method” (Goodman 1961). From 2012 to 2014, in-
depth interviews with 20 key interviewees were conducted, develop-
ing from their business, kinship, religious, and social networks. Every 
interview took approximately one week’s time, including interviews 
during participant observation in the market, and in coffee shops and 
restaurants. I also collected other information from key informants in 
the market – for instance, the administrators. Third, as this research 
intends to reveal the informal strategies of migrants, I decided to use 
participant observation in order to increase my opportunities to ac-
cess the working and living environment of migrants. I met the Chen 
sisters, two migrants working in the market, in a house church 
through a religious network. This network provided a good basis of 
trust upon which to conduct the observation in the market and the 
interviews. 
The megacity of Shanghai is known as a global financial centre 
with an enormous migrant population; as of 2013, 40.69 per cent of 
the city’s 24.15 million residents were from outside of Shanghai. The 
term “megacity” has been defined by United Nations as a metropol-
itan area with a total population of more than 10 million people. In 
2005 megacities accounted for approximately 9.3 per cent (UN 2006) 
of the world’s urban population while in 2015 the figure dropped to 
7.9 per cent (Demographia 2015). The stamp–card–banknote (䛞঑ᐱ, 
you ka bi,) market is an important organisation in the informal econ-
omy and is located in Z District of Shanghai, where approximately 
1,000 traders sell stamps, telephone cards, Chinese banknotes, and 
ancient coins in a 4,000-square-metre, two-story building. It is one of 
the two biggest stamp–card–banknote collections and speculation 
markets in China; the other is located in Beijing. Each of these 1,000 
self-employed employers have one or two informal employees. 
Therefore, in sum, this market has approximately 2,500 informal 
employees. 
This stamp–card–banknote market is neither “state-owned” nor 
a “collective” danwei that offers “formal employment,” though it is an 
organisation for “cultural exchange on stamps,” as it is registered 
with and supervised under the government of Z District. In this re-
gard, it can offer neither hukou registration in Shanghai nor so-called 
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“dossier management” (ẓṸ㇑⨶, dang’an guanli) in the Chinese per-
sonnel system. It offers informal employment only. ILO guidelines 
state that the informal sector is composed of businesses with a small 
number of employees, and businesses whose employees are not regis-
tered. If an employee has no formal employment contract with her/ 
his employer or if s/he has such a contract but cannot participate in 
pension insurance and medical insurance, then the status of her/his 
job meets the definition of informal employment (ILO 1993, 2003). 
According to Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro’s most recent work 
(2010), the informal sector is comprised of market-oriented produc-
tion activities that are hidden from state authority to avoid  
 paying income, value-added, or other taxes;  
 making social security contributions;  
 having to meet certain legal labour-market standards, such as 
minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, and 
so on; and  
 complying with certain administrative procedures, such as com-
pleting statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms.  
Since the Maoist era, “personnel dossiers” – which include one’s 
employment history, criminal history, party membership, and so on – 
have been referred to by work unit officials to decide whether an 
employee should be promoted. Also, they provide evidence of how 
and whether one could take part in a typical kind of welfare system. 
The activity in the market is still considered a kind of “stall trading” 
even if the trading takes place in a flashy market building in the city 
centre. Each cubicle owner signs contracts with the market adminis-
trators to rent the spaces, but the market has no other relationship 
with the owners of the office cubicles. As long as there are no em-
ployment records or working contracts with official “employers,” 
these traders cannot access the local welfare or security system offi-
cially if they are not originally registered in Shanghai. In other words, 
they are doubly marginalised by the danwei and the hukou systems 
while employed in this informal economy (Xue, Gao, and Guo 2014). 
My interviewees working in this market are all non-hukou mi-
grants coming from different provinces. One group of migrant-
traders are “employers,” as most of them started their businesses in 
the 1990s or early 2000s. They have accumulated millions of yuan in 
wealth, though they also experienced economic crisis at the end of 
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1990s when the government started to control speculation. They are 
employers because they are creating their own development model, 
accumulating capital, and in charge of the success or failure of their 
business. In this paper, Brother Cao, Brother Li, Brother Tu, and 
Aunty Chen (pseudonyms) are the migrants I label entrepreneurs, the 
group which comprises 40 per cent of the market. By contrast, some 
of the most successful entrepreneurs are no longer sitting in the mar-
ket but rather hiring “employees” to run the daily business. These 
employees, comprising the other 60 per cent of the market, are often 
members of their employers’ families: mostly cousins, nephews, and 
nieces. The Chen sisters, with whom I spent a considerable amount 
of time, are the nieces and “employees” of Aunty Chen.  
In the Chinese context, “migrants” are defined by the hukou sys-
tem. According to the NBS, individuals who live in another location 
other than the place of their permanent hukou residence and are regis-
tered there as temporary residents for more than six months a year 
are called “non-hukou migrants,” while those who have migrated and 
re-registered their hukou at the new destination are called “hukou mi-
grants” (Luo 2014). Chan, Wing, and Zhang (1999) were the first 
researchers to point out that there are big differences between these 
two important groups of migrants. Hukou migrants tend to originate 
in urban areas and are much more likely to have a college education 
and be employed in more skilled jobs, while non-hukou migrants are 
mostly from rural areas and have a much lower level of educational 
attainment. Hukou labour migrants tend to move through govern-
mental and formal channels, while non-hukou migrants rely on their 
own, often informal, sources for jobs.  
Migrants Traders in the Informal Sector: Doubly 
Marginalised by Formal Institutions in Shanghai 
Many researchers point out the unequal influences of the hukou sys-
tem on economic, employment, and other forms of welfare (Liu 
2005; Afridi, Li, and Ren 2012). Employment in government offices 
and state-owned enterprises in cities continues to be unavailable to 
rural migrant workers unless they convert to an urban hukou. The rule 
that only residents with a local hukou shall have access to jobs in 
“good” danwei is strictly enforced. For instance, working as a civil 
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servant for government is considered preferable due to the high-qual-
ity welfare schemes attached to it. In 2011 the Beijing municipal gov-
ernment required that the applicants  
have Beijing permanent hukou; [that] their human and administra-
tive relations (Ӫһ㹼᭯ޣ㌫, renshi xingzheng guanxi) be located in 
Beijing; [and that they] be over 18 but below 35 years old 
(BMHRSSB 2011). 
Moreover, it is clearly stated that “those 2011 graduates who are not 
originally from Beijing and those who graduated before 2011 whose 
hukou dossiers are only temporarily kept in the universities” would 
not be taken into consideration for civil servant positions 
(BMHRSSB 2011). The hukou restriction might not be written directly 
into the key requirements, but having a Beijing hukou is often a sub-
requirement for listed positions, even today (Beijing 2015). Other 
research shows that migrants with a rural hukou have many disad-
vantages in terms of their ability to enter job markets in cities (MyCos 
Research 2009; Liu and Chan 1999).  
Being disadvantaged in the job market is the key reason why mi-
grants largely end up in the informal sector. Both Chen Jie and Chen 
Mei have been working in the market since 2007. The Chen sisters 
are in charge of a small cubicle that belongs to their aunt, who owns 
the business. According to them, “We had not yet got enough money 
to start our own business, and every boss needs reliable employees so 
that’s why we were hired by our aunt” (Anonymous 1 2012). There 
are no working contracts between the Chen sisters and their aunt; and 
there is no subordinated welfare. As Chen Jie (33 years old) ex-
plained,  
I have insurance in my hometown, [X] Village, [Y] County, Anhui 
Province, in the rural area where I pay a monthly fee for medical 
insurance. I enrolled in that programme because my mother-in-
law told me to do it, but I don’t really know what it is. In these 
years, I just hope I don’t get sick in Shanghai; otherwise, it’s diffi-
cult to get anything reimbursed. According to the Anhui Rural 
Healthcare Regulation, there is little which can be reimbursed if I 
see doctors in big cities, while maybe in the local rural areas, yes, I 
can get some money back. So normally, I just go to a local phar-
macy to get some medicines if I am sick. I have never thought of 
what will happen if I am seriously sick. Maybe I have to go back 
to my county to cure myself so that I can be reimbursed. […] I al-
so never think of old-age pensions. I have no idea and I think as 
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long as we earn enough money, then we will support ourselves 
when we are old. I don’t want to pay more money to the govern-
ment. (Anonymous 2 2012) 
According to Cai (2011), since 2008, various local governments have 
supported the development of some forms of social security. 
Measures include the following: First, the Employment Contract Law 
came into effect in 2008, which requires enterprises to sign labour 
contracts with all employees, regardless of their hukou status, and to 
include them in basic social insurance programmes. Second, local 
governments have increased the frequency and scale of minimum 
wage adjustments. After 2003, when the new labour shortage took 
place, the central government requested that local governments adjust 
the level of minimum wages every year. Third, the coverage of mi-
grant workers in basic social insurance programmes through the issu-
ance of the Interim Measures on the Transfer of Continuation of 
Basic Pension for Urban Enterprise Employees was required by the 
central government in 2010. The “Interim Measures” stipulate that all 
workers must participate in a basic pension programme; moreover, if 
a worker migrates across provincial boundaries, they guarantee con-
tinuation of his or her pension in both individual and pooling ac-
counts in the new workplace. This new regulation, according to Cai, 
“provides institutionally guaranteed portability of migrant workers’ 
pension entitlements” (Cai 2011: 41). 
Nevertheless, none of these rules have been applied to any of the 
migrants working in this market. I interviewed Brother Cao (38 years 
old, from Henan Province) and Brother Tu (32 years old, from Shan-
dong Province). Brother Cao rationalises why they are not in the 
social welfare system this way:  
You know, we don’t pay tax […]. In foreign countries, people pay 
tax because the governments there offer good social welfare but in 
China we don’t have anything. Here, I only pay a 1,100 yuan ad-
ministration fee for the market every month, and that’s our only 
relationship with the market. (Anonymous 8 2013 ) 
Being outside of the tax system and social welfare system are two 
important symbols of defining the informal economy. First, those 
migrant-traders are working for themselves rather than for certain 
“enterprises” or danwei. This status does not entitle them to any bene-
fits from the welfare system, as there are no “employers” who are 
responsible for them. Second, the relationship between these mi-
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grants and the market is like a normal “owner–renter” relationship, 
which means migrant-traders pay a monthly rental and administration 
fee for a specific space measuring anywhere from two to six square 
metres as an office cubicle in the market, while the market offers 
space and administration services for entrepreneurs.  
In the case of direct social security, migrants have much lower 
participation rates than those of local workers in social insurance 
programmes (see Table 2), and they are not entitled to the guaranteed 
minimum living allowance, which is only offered to urban employees. 
Table 2. Comparison of Social Insurance Programmes for Migrants and 















workers 57.0 52.7 40.9 47.9 34.9 
Migrant 
workers 9.8 13.1 3.7 24.1 2.0 
Source: Cai 2011. 
Hukou Transfer as a Code of Conduct 
Social settings are informal to varying extents, and individuals adapt 
to different expectations within different social contexts. Informal 
institutions provide another conduit for trust and cooperation 
through which social change can be achieved, sometimes even more 
efficiently than through formal institutional channels. The prevalence 
of informal institutions, and the diverse private patterns of action that 
run parallel to the formal system in the developing world, such as in 
China, are partially due to the existence of “ornamental institutions,” 
which conceal an anarchic and irregular underground world and have 
led to the emergence of informal institutions since 1979 (Sun and Liu 
2014: 3; Hu 1982: 21).  
The hierarchical welfare provision between rural and urban spaces, 
also between citizens, is a burden borne largely by migrants. Conver-
sion of hukou status is difficult to attain, especially from a position 
lower in the hierarchy to a higher one. The most desirable hukou are 
the autonomous city hukou (e.g. Beijing and Shanghai), the second-
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most popular are capital city hukou (e.g. Guangzhou), followed by 
prefecture hukou, county hukou, township hukou, and village hukou, the 
last of which is completely undesirable (Luo 2012: 124).  
Facing the problem of being marginalised in the city, the mi-
grants have formed a new code of conduct to obtain an official urban 
hukou to realise the formal transition of passage (Luo 2012; Solinger 
1995), although this is still very difficult. By “code of conduct,” I 
mean a set of rules outlining the social norms and responsibilities of, 
and proper practices for, an individual. When groups of migrants 
form this kind of code of conduct, the action sets up rules for the 
community. According to North (1990, 1991), a code of conduct 
together with other constraints, sanctions, taboos, customs, and tradi-
tions form the informal institutions that might compete with or ac-
commodate formal institutions (rules, constitutions, laws, and proper-
ty rights) in a specific social structure. In 1992 a Beijing hukou cost 
CNY 20,000 and a Harbin one cost CNY 3,000, in addition to a solid 
personal connection (guanxi) (Solinger 1995). “Those with power use 
power; those with money buy it, those with neither write, [and] run 
back and forth,” as Solinger (1995: 127) stated. Anyone with proper 
power or connections would like prefer an urban hukou over a rural 
one. Also based on the hierarchy of hukou, people would like to ob-
tain a hukou at a higher level of hierarchy rather than a lower one 
(Luo 2012).  
Hans Steinmüller points out there are some activities that both 
local people and officials recognise as inappropriate but that fly in the 
face of national pronouncements. He argues,  
the boundaries between state and society are made by exposing 
and hiding spaces of cultural intimacy; and this everyday practice 
reproduces both local sociality and the state itself. (Steinmüller 
2010: 548)  
I see the activities of buying hukou and falsely obtaining hukou as “in-
appropriate activities”; the latter is, in fact, an illegal activity rather 
than simply “inappropriate.” Nevertheless, migrants see this as a code 
of conduct, which could be legitimised by them, as the hukou system 
itself is an unequal institution. 
There are also other approaches to registering under a new hukou – 
for instance, through the “points system” in Shanghai, which is de-
scribed below (Luo 2012). Purchasing real estate is another possible 
method by which to attain an urban hukou in Shanghai. Aunty Chen, 
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who had accumulated more than 10 million CNY in capital since the 
1990s, obtained a Shanghai hukou by buying a house there in 2001, as 
at that time the policy still allowed migrants to do that. Her son ob-
tained a hukou there as well, as a consequence of his mother’s hukou. 
The whole family settled down in Shanghai, becoming members of 
the “new Shanghainese.” Her grandson is now five years old and 
attends school in Shanghai. But this family is an exception; 95 per 
cent of traders in the market can be defined as “non-hukou” migrants 
whose registrations are still in their original hometowns – approxi-
mately half in rural areas, but some in townships, counties, or even 
other big cities (Fieldwork note, 3 July 2013). Thus, most traders are 
not able to realise the transfer of their hukou statuses even if most are 
trying out the possibilities. 
Justified Artificiality as a New Norm 
Informal institutions are strengthened by the collective act of estab-
lishing new norms for the behaviours of marginalised actors. Al-
though the “points system” in Shanghai seems as if it offers access to 
a residence card, it prioritises hukou transfers for those with higher 
human and financial capital, very similar to the US green card system. 
For migrant-traders who have limited education, it is still very diffi-
cult to enrol in the system. The new regulations of the “points sys-
tem” starting from July 2013 have increased the standard to 120 
points. Paying for social security in Shanghai counts for three points 
every year. But having a university diploma contributes 60 points. 
Brother Li, from Liangshan County in Shandong Province, is 33 years 
old and dropped out of primary school during the fifth grade. He 
earned 3 million CNY in the years from 2006 to 2012 by speculating 
in circulating banknotes and commemorative notes (㓚ᘥᐱ, jinianbi). 
He is now trying to obtain a hukou through the educational passage. 
To do so, he first went back to his hometown to obtain an “artificial” 
high school diploma through personal connections. He used that 
diploma to register at an online university. Basically, he pays some-
where around 5,000 CNY every year, and the university has promised 
that he will receive his degree in five years despite him having taken 
no classes. He will then be able to use this “real” university diploma 
to apply for local residency. Brother Li believes that paying thousands 
of yuan a year is worth it in the long run, in order to get his son into 
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the local education system and provide an equal opportunity for his 
family in Shanghai.  
Another significant collective artificiality in employment status 
concerns children’s education and home ownership. Since 2013, if 
migrants’ children are to be allowed to attend school in Shanghai, one 
of their parents must have an insurance account in Shanghai (Ano-
nymous 9 2013; Anonymous 11 2014). Since 2010, the government 
has restricted the migrants in Shanghai from purchasing houses, re-
quiring migrants to have made social security payments for at least 13 
months in order to be qualified to purchase a house. 
Housing has only been open to the market since the 1980s. Never-
theless, all of the housing supplies are allocated according to hukou 
status. In 1994 the state council issued the “Decisions on Deepening 
the Urban Housing Reform”; one of the measures was to push for-
ward the Economic and Comfortable Housing Project, which aims to 
assist lower-income families in urban areas. In 2004 the criteria were 
subsequently clarified further in the “Measures for Managing Eco-
nomic and Comfortable Housing” (Ministry of Construction et al. 
2004) along these lines:  
 Applicants must be registered in urban households.  
 Either applicants must be homeless or the size of their living 
space must be smaller than the county government’s housing line 
(measured by square metres per person).  
 Applicants’ income should not exceed the levels set by the rele-
vant county government.  
Welfare housing is restricted to local residents, and free-market hous-
ing favoured local residents, too – especially after 2011, when the 
housing market continued to see prices increase. Beijing mandates 
that migrants can purchase houses only if they have paid taxes and 
social security for more than five years in the city.  
Both Brother Li and Brother Cao obtained artificial employment 
status by joining a local danwei in Shanghai through their own connec-
tions. Fake dossiers were made in order to buy a local house and get 
their children into the local education system. For example, the min-
imum wage in Shanghai in 2014 was 1,820 CNY, and in Li’s regis-
tered danwei, the lowest wage was 2,000 CNY. In this case, an indi-
vidual pays 17.5 per cent of his gross income towards insurance. The 
employer pays an amount equivalent to 42.5 per cent of the employ-
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ee’s gross income as well. Altogether, it comes to 60 per cent of the 
employee’s gross income. But because it is false employment, Brother 
Li had to pay the entire 60 per cent of the lowest wages (1,200 CNY) 
himself (Anonymous 11 2014).  
For Brother Cao, 41 years old, who came from Kaifeng in He-
nan Province and now runs a business in the market with around 2 
million CNY in capital, the situation is the same. He pays 1,700 CNY 
every month for “five insurances and one fund” (ӄ䲙а䠁, wu xian yi 
jin), which means “medical insurance, pension, unemployment insur-
ance, maternity insurance, injury insurance, and housing fund.” 
Brother Cao has been registered for insurance in the artificial danwei 
for ten years. Earlier, he had registered himself in Kaifeng City in his 
father-in-law’s real-estate company, where he needed to pay only 
200–300 CNY per month. But in Shanghai, the amount is much 
higher. Nevertheless, he must do it, lest his son not be allowed to 
finish school in Shanghai, which would be the case unless one of the 
parents has an insurance account in Shanghai, according to the new 
regulation issued by Shanghai Bureau of Education (2013). His son is 
now finishing his first year in junior high school and the boy still has 
two years to go before he enters senior high school. He expects that 
the policy in Shanghai will change one day and that his son, who has 
a hukou in Kaifeng like his parents, will be allowed to participate in 
university entrance exams in Shanghai after finishing senior high 
school. Due to the consistency system just initiated by the state coun-
cil, he is not allowed to have one insurance in Kaifeng and one in 
Shanghai. As Shanghai is always initiating the reform of social policy 
in China, Brother Cao was directly impacted after the new regulation 
was announced in February 2014, and now he must cancel the insur-
ance in Kaifeng and attain a new one in Shanghai. He expects that the 
housing fund can also be used if he wants to purchase a house in 
Shanghai; he could also get the money back if he does not purchase a 
house (Anonymous 3 2012, Anonymous 10 2013, Anonymous 12 
2014). He has this concern about the housing fund because at present 
in China there is no nationwide comprehensive insurance system 
which one could transfer between cities. Rural migrant workers can 
only withdraw accumulated funds from their individual accounts if 
they leave the city where they made contributions. In 2009 the State 
Council initiated the “Measures on How to Extend or Transfer Pen-
sions for Urban Employees” (෾ᐲ㙼ᐕสᵜޫ㘱؍䲙ޣ㌫᧕㔝઼䖜
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〫࣎⌅, Chengshi zhigong jiben yanglao boxian guanxi jiexu he zhuanyi banfa), 
supporting the transfer of pension rights and benefits across prov-
inces for the urban worker pension scheme in order to improve port-
ability, but its implementation has been limited so far (World Bank 
2014: 208). 
Gua kao danwei (ᤲ䶐অս) is a very special phenomenon inherit-
ed as a legacy of the socialist system after 1958, and it relates to the 
hukou system. It literally means to be “attached” or “affiliated” to a 
“work unit” – for instance, a collectively owned company or enter-
prise. There are two categories of artificial affiliations. The first cate-
gory is located in the business trade. Enterprises (units), social 
groups, or individuals in the preliminary phase of the development 
process obtain an artificial affiliation under the name of some other 
enterprises for certain purposes. For this kind of affiliation, generally 
two sides sign an agreement, which indicates how much in manage-
ment fees the affiliated person should pay. The artificial employers 
have no investment, operating conditions, or credit/debit relationship 
with the artificial employee, and are responsible only for applying for 
a business licence and the other various types of licences and tax 
registrations. The second category refers especially to household regis-
tration dossiers. For instance, graduates who cannot find a job in the 
city in which they attended university face the problem that all their 
registration dossiers that were temporarily stored in the universities 
will be repatriated to where they were originally registered at birth. 
Therefore, the graduates must look for temporary danwei to keep their 
dossiers. Normally, some kind of “tripartite agreement” is signed that 
allows the graduates to put their personal dossiers into the files of the 
danwei archive, but there is no actual employment relationship. As 
mentioned earlier, Beijing hukou are becoming more and more costly, 
and they can be directly valued in yuan on the black market. Few 
state-owned and collective enterprises can obtain most quotas (ᤷḷ, 
zhibiao) every year, which define how many employees annually can 
transfer their hukou to Beijing; few private enterprises like high-tech 
companies also get some access. Unused quotas from the danwei can 
be sold on the black market and to people with whom the managers 
of the danwei have good connections. This category of artificial em-
ployment usually takes place in this fashion.  
Brother Cao and Brother Li entered the second category of arti-
ficial employment in order to enable their children to attend schools 
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in Shanghai and because both welfare housing and free-market hous-
ing are strictly constrained not only by the hukou system but also by 
the social security system, the latter of which is still fundamentally 
defined by the former. Brother Li had started to purchase a house in 
2012 by allocating his social security payment, which he had obtained 
through artificial danwei employment since 2010. In 2013, when I 
went back to the market, Brother Li had already completed purchas-
ing his new house, providing evidence for the fact that artificial danwei 
employment can work effectively.  
The Legitimacy of Guanxi as an Informal
Practice
I argue that the rise of informal institutions is caused by the emer-
gence of new norms and collective behaviours. Justified artificiality as 
a new norm works through guanxi. When faced with the formal con-
straints of the hukou and the danwei systems, which do not support 
proper social welfare, more than 80 per cent of non-hukou migrant-
traders have managed to create artificial employment with danwei that 
they obtain through guanxi. I follow Yang (1994: 10) and Guthrie 
(1998) who define guanxi as “the cultivation of personal relationships 
and networks of mutual dependence, and the manufacturing of obli-
gation and indebtedness.” Guanxi was seen in socialist China as a 
persistent resistance to the authoritarian party-state power.  
In the case of attaining access to local schools, guanxi is used by 
almost every interviewee who has a child attending a local school in 
Shanghai, for several reasons. One reason is that before 2010 school 
selection fees in cities were customary. Public schools with good re-
putations always charged students miscellaneous fees on top of their 
regular education costs. A conservative estimate indicated that annual 
school selection fees (a fee charged to students without a registered 
residential status in the district where the school is located) in Beijing 
amounted to over 1 billion CNY in 2002 (Yang 2004). In Beijing, the 
school selection fees of some key secondary schools reached CNY 
40,000 or even 70,000 per student, far more than the officially per-
mitted limit (Chak, Ngok, and Phillips 2008). Given this, it is even 
more difficult for the migrants to get their kids into the education 
system.  
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Citizens with different hukou statuses have different levels of ac-
cess to educational resources, from kindergarten all the way to uni-
versity (CECC 2005). Researchers argue that the same barrier to edu-
cation occurs when students seek to participate in the university en-
rolment examination (Mok, Wong, and Zhang 2009). Normally, chil-
dren cannot apply or participate in the exam in a given city if their 
hukou is not from that city. Meanwhile, children with hukou in big 
cities such as Beijing or Shanghai can access top universities with 
much lower scores than those registered in rural areas or even other 
small cities. 
In June 2006 the newly revised Compulsory Education Law stip-
ulates that the hosted city governments should deal with the educa-
tion of children of migrant workers by providing equal access to 
compulsory education, which has become a legal obligation of the 
government. In 2010 the government issued the “National Long-
Term Education Reform and Development Programme (2010–
2020)”:  
Local government should offer basic full-time public schools to 
ensure that migrant workers’ children receive equal access to 
compulsory education; it should study and formulate a way to help 
them participate in entrance examinations in the local hosted cit-
ies.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to the reality, it is still difficult to im-
plement these measures due to limited resources.  
Brother Cao’s son is 11 years old and studying in the fourth 
grade:  
Now migrant kids can go to school but of course not the good 
ones. The quota is given to urban kids first. My son therefore has 
to go to another, worse and smaller school. (Anonymous 4 2012)  
Brother Li, who, as we have seen, has better connections, sends his 
son to school as well: 
My son, seven years old, goes to primary school. I came to know a 
neighbour who has guanxi with the leader of the school. So I just 
sent some gift so my son gets into a good school in the compul-
sory stage. (Anonymous 5 2012)  
Sister Wu (34 years old, from Hunan) agrees:  
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I just got my daughter (5 years old) into a summer class to teach 
her how to tell stories. I pay 3,300 yuan for half a semester. She is 
now in kindergarten. You know it is difficult to go into public 
school but if you have connections then it works. We just made a 
gift of several thousand yuan and got her into the public kinder-
garten. In China, as long as you have money and guanxi, then it 
works. (Anonymous 6 2012)  
Brother Hou (33 years old, from Shandong) could not agree more:  
I got a connection with the Baoshan District Bureau of Education 
to get my son into the Shanghai University Subordinate Primary 
School. It costs me ancient coins and top-quality “Longjing tea” 
worth more than 2,800 yuan. You know, even for local Shang-
hainese, it is difficult to enrol in that school. And now my son is 
performing very well, which I am very proud of. (Anonymous 7 
2012)  
Guanxi as an informal practice is prevalent in explaining migrants’ 
actions and strategies in Shanghai. On the one hand, the formalisa-
tion, normalisation, and institutionalisation of social relations have 
been seen as characteristics of modernity, as face-to-face interactions 
are replaced by impersonal bureaucracy and finance (Morand 1995). 
On the other hand, informal institutions can emerge from the con-
straints of unequal formal institutions; guanxi practice has been in-
formally adopted and internalised by the marginalised actors. 
Conclusion and Discussion: Nature of Divergent 
Informal Institutions and Their Development 
This paper has revealed how migrants’ agency, actions, and strategies 
create new forms of informal institutions in the megacity of Shanghai 
when they face institutional constraints from the danwei and hukou 
systems, which marginalise them in terms of their access to social 
welfare. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, China has tried to construct an egalitarian society, in particular 
by implementing the danwei system in urban areas. The danwei system 
offered daily household items, as well as all forms of welfare, includ-
ing housing, pensions, education, healthcare, and so on, to urban 
employees and residents. The hukou system has helped to distribute 
all these welfare protections and has defined citizens’ hierarchical 
access to them. By paying special attention to how these formal insti-
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tutions influence the distribution of social welfare in megacities, this 
paper explores the close relationship between social welfare and the 
hierarchical access for migrants in urban settings.  
By using ethnographic data collected in the informal sector, a 
speculative market in Shanghai consisting of 95 per cent “non-hukou” 
migrants and 5 per cent local Shanghainese or “hukou migrants,” I 
explore how these “non-hukou” migrants face risk and uncertainty, 
hope and despair while they are doubly marginalised by the hukou and 
danwei systems and thus rarely have access to the welfare provisions 
covered by social policies in this megacity. Informal institutions are 
used to explore a social situation and social pattern in which migrants 
activate their strategies and tactics to skirt the restrictions of social 
policies. 
Three forms of informal institutions that are created by the mi-
grants’ daily practice in the megacity of Shanghai are observed in this 
paper. These three types of informal institutions are hukou transfer as 
a code of conduct, justified artificiality as a new norm, and the legiti-
macy of guanxi as an informal practice, all of which reflect the emer-
gence of new informal institutions that act divergently to and in paral-
lel with the formal institutions, especially the hukou and danwei sys-
tems. First, a code of conduct, as a set of rules, forms the informal 
institutions that might compete with or accommodate formal institu-
tions (rules, constitutions, laws, and property rights) in a specific so-
cial structure, and allows migrants to transfer their hukou status and 
re-register themselves in the city. This code of conduct has been gen-
erally internalised and accepted by the actors. Second, justified artifi-
ciality, as a new norm through which migrants legitimise their actions 
by registering in artificial working units, helps migrants get into the 
local social security, education, and housing systems. Third, mobilis-
ing guanxi as a legitimised institution becomes a common practice 
driven by the rationalities of migrants in a social context in which 
migrants positively and partially integrate themselves into urban set-
tings.  
These forms of informal institutions are created against the 
backdrop of effective formal institutions. “Effectiveness” entails that, 
for the most part, formal rules and procedures are enforced or com-
plied with in practice in a relatively strict manner. The purpose of 
both formal institutions discussed here, hukou and danwei, is to offer 
the citizens hierarchical access to social welfare, through which the 
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Chinese government can achieve imbalanced development among 
regions and people. Since the Mao Zedong era in 1950s, this mecha-
nism has been seen as one of the most important measures support-
ing urban development while retaining welfare in rural areas, as well 
as subsidising urban development with rural-to-urban migrant labour. 
In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping advocated “allowing some people to 
become rich first” (䇙а䜘࠶Ӫݸᇼ䎧ᶕ, rang yibufen ren xian fuqilai), 
which was established on a similar ideology that perpetuated the idea 
that citizens and their welfare statuses should be and are hierarchical 
and unequal. 
In this social situation, the emergence of divergent informal in-
stitutions accommodates the unequal outcomes of formal institu-
tions. As Helmke and Levitsky (2006) point out, the existence of 
divergent informal rules could alter the substantive effect of formal 
institutions, while not directly violating them. Accommodating in-
formal institutions are mostly created by the marginalised actors who 
do not like the outcome of formal rules, but at the same time are “not 
able to change or openly violate these rules” (Helmke and Levitsky 
2006: 14). Accommodation takes place when the direct outcomes of 
formal and informal institutions substantially differ from each other. 
In the end, this paper seeks to draw attention to the conse-
quences of these informal institutions for formal institutions. These 
forms of informal institutions might be further manipulated by the 
actors to influence the formal institutions and lead to endogenous 
institutional change (Tsai 2006, 2007). Here, informal institutions are 
seen by the actors as justified and legitimised, as the formal institution 
itself is hierarchical and unequal. These informal institutions are 
working divergently to and in parallel with the formal institutions, but 
it remains to be seen whether they will eventually accommodate or 
compete with the formal institutions, depending on whether the for-
mal institutions are effective or ineffective (Helmke and Levitsky 
2006: 14). 
Although the Xi Jinping government initiated a new reform of 
the hukou system on 24 July 2014 (ഭ࣑䲒ޣҾ䘋а↕᧘䘋ᡧ㉽ࡦᓖ᭩
䶙Ⲵ᜿㿱, Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu tuijin huji zhidu gaige de yijian) that 
calls for a steady relaxation of hukou transfer in small and medium-
sized cities and a reasonable relaxation in big cities with populations 
of three to five million to achieve 100 million rural-to-urban hukou 
transfers by 2020, at the same time the government has dramatically 
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tightened the control of hukou transfers in megacities with popula-
tions of more than five million. Similar to the case in Shanghai, in 
Beijing the institutions controlling migration through purchasing a 
house and through employment have been bolstered and vested with 
the power to also control through educational access. Since April 
2014, migrants in Beijing need to submit more than five dossiers and 
certificates in order to get their kids into primary and junior high 
schools – namely, employment contracts, house ownership or leasing 
contracts, residence permits, the original hukou booklets, the certifi-
cates offered by local government to show absence of supervision for 
children in the original hukou registration region, and different certifi-
cates that prove that one’s social security is legally registered in Bei-
jing for two to five years, depending on the different regulations under 
the different local district governments of Beijing. Facing more and 
more diversified institutional constraints fostered by multiple levels 
of the Chinese government, migrants have to respond accordingly 
with varied strategies. Although the reforms to the hukou system are 
not that drastic, the question remains as to what degree these infor-
mal institutions and migrants’ accumulative action will influence the 
hukou system, especially in megacities.  
As observed, those migrants working in the speculation market 
possess business talents and strong homeland connections, and have 
great abilities to develop local guanxi networks. As a whole, most of 
those migrants in the market enjoy an average yearly income of CNY 
50,000, although in an economic crisis the loss might also be substan-
tial, like what happened to Brother Cao in the Asian financial crisis of 
1997. It would be interesting for future research to compare these 
groups of migrants with others who are working in the service sectors – 
for example, street vendors – as occupational characteristics and eco-
nomic status might differentiate their strategies and actions and, thus, 
might lead to different informal institutions.  
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